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Loren Lybarger’s essay aims to point out that once dominant secularism is still alive
among Palestinians in Chicago, although those who embrace it live in a “marginal,
disconnected space” brought on by the ascendance of Islamic religious institutions
and faith-based organizations, businesses catering to an Islamic lifestyle, and
persons choosing a pious Islamic “way of life.” He argues that even though
secularism represents an apparent minority perspective among Palestinians [here I
am not sure whether he means Muslim Palestinians or all Palestinians] examining it
remains important. It is important because of the recent and increasing tendency
among scholars to explain the actions of people who happen to be Muslim by
referring to Islamic religious beliefs, values, practices, and history. Aside from
potentially being wrong, these scholarly treatments obscure the social forces that
shape Islamic identities as well as those that keep secularism alive. Furthermore,
the overlapping and weaving complexities of human social life are obfuscated by
when a secular/religious dichotomy is used as an analytic tool. Secularism and
religious revival are “interactive and mutually constituting processes,” as each of
these ideological positions is often deployed by persons and groups in response to
the other. Finally, he argues that studying Palestinian secularism allows us to
understand the mechanisms and processes that help it to persist. After reviewing
some of the scholarly debates surrounding the terms “secular” and “religious,”
Lybarger embraces the calls of Taylor, Casanova, and Starrett to carefully study the
meanings attributed to and deployments undertaken in the name of these
ideological stances. Secularism needs to be studied because people, groups, and
states continue to take actions and counter actions in its name.
Lybarger states that his analysis will emphasize the subjective meanings individuals
ascribe to social action, which he organizes into patterned groupings using the
Weberian tool of ideal types. He defines secularism as an ideal type of “recurring
stance that individuals can adopt across a range of diverse social contexts” that
“implicitly resists, rejects, demotes, or otherwise ignores the prior claim of religious
solidarity” with religion positioned as “subordinate, ancillary, or relative to other
identities.” Secularism can be a social orientation, practice, mode of solidarity, or
stance. What makes an orientation secular is the “explicit rejection or implicit
irrelevance to it of the primacy of religious authority as a foundation for individual
ethics, social identification, political unity, and governance.”
Surely secularism exists among Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, and I
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concur with the author that its continuing presence is often overshadowed by the
focus of many scholars on matters Islamic. To me, the most interesting part of this
essay is the part that interacts with the type of research I do as a sociologist who has
long studied Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim American communities. In the following,
I take a closer look at the three ideal-typical modes of secularism Lybarger
discovered in his interviews and especially at the paths people are said to have
taken to arrive at secularism, commenting on them using findings from my current
and prior research. These comments do not indicate that the processes Lybarger
identified are inaccurate, but they do suggest some complexities and next steps in
data collection and analysis. As I explain below, with regard to “secularism in the
Post-Islamic key” I would like to see what interviews with younger generations of
Palestinian Americans might uncover. As for the two types of syncretic secularism
Lybarger identified, I suggest that gendered upbringing explains some of the
differences in the process towards secularism between the case studies of Ismael
and Muna: in many ways their routes were determined by their gender as it
intersects with how being raised as a Muslim in the US is interpreted and
implemented by parents and community.
The first ideal type Lybarger discusses is “secularism in the Post-Islamic key.” This is
a discursive mode that reformulates pan-Arabist and leftist thinking in ways that
respond to the rise of Islam in Chicago and in Palestine. Here we see clear evidence
of a mutually constitutive process as these reformulations take into account and
come to terms with the multiple ways that Islamic institutions, organizations,
values, and lifestyles have increased in popularity and dominance. This is done
discursively by interpreting actions and events that might give internal credibility to
this upsurge as really being less about Islam and more about the failings and
shortcomings of non-Islamic institutions and the harmful interventions of external
others.
According to Lybarger, this type of secular perspective is learned. It is passed down
through family discussions and through the transmission of a collective narrative
that is specific to secular community-based programs. These programs
communicate such a narrative through Arabic classes and history lessons, cultural
and artistic groups, and activist solidarities. In other words, learning this type of
secularism requires family and community action. I wonder what impact the
passage of time, globalization, and ongoing changes in Chicago’s Palestinian
community have had on the life of this ideological perspective. Research data that I
am now analyzing, based on interviews I conducted with ninety-three transnational
Arab American teenagers [born and raised in the US, taken “back home” for high
school], would suggest that meaningful vehicles of communication, as well as the
narratives they convey, have changed for younger generations. With regard to
Palestinian American teens, I found — to my enormous surprise — that the
overwhelming majority had negative pre-dispositions toward Palestine before
moving there with their families, had never read a book, heard a poem, or seen a
film about Palestine, had not attended the programs of a secular Arab organization,
and knew mostly, and sometimes only, that Palestine was a violent place. While
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these teens had a strong identification with Palestine instilled by their parents, very
few had internalized any type of collective narrative, whether secular, religious, or
other, about Palestine. This includes youth who attended Arabic classes [Qur’an] at
religious institutions, for indeed religious institutions were usually the only sources
of such language training. [It is important to point out that in most places in the US,
Muslim institutions are more ethnically diverse and less Palestine-concentrated
than in the southwest suburbs of Chicago.] The majority of youth reported that their
main sources of information about Palestine were the US and Arabic-language
media, the latter being what their parents watched, and occasionally the stories of a
relative returning from Palestine to the US. Rather than a collective narrative, these
sources transferred unmediated images of violence. So, I would ask, if secularism in
the post-Islamic key is passed down through family and learned in secular
organizations, what shall be the fate of this type of secularism in the current
generation of youth?
Lybarger identifies two other, less politicized and more implicit, forms of “syncretic
secularism” that emerged from his interviews. One he attributes to the “impact of
assimilation processes,” while the other reflects a “disenchantment originating
within the religious milieu itself.” Quotes from his interviews with a married couple,
Ismael and Muna, are used to highlight the social processes that produce these two
forms. Upon reading this section I saw the typical gendered upbringing patterns that
characterize Palestinian American Muslim communities. Ismael, as a male, is
allowed to attend public schools, mix socially with non-Arabs and non-Muslims,
engage in activities that go against Islamic teachings, and work in the settings of his
choice. Muna, as a female, is required to conform to her parents’ views of proper
Muslim decorum and behavior, which likely excluded almost everything Ismael was
allowed to do. The details notwithstanding — his enlistment in the Navy, her
attendance at a strict Islamic school, his family in which piety was not central and
hers where it was said to be but her father drank alcohol and engaged in nonmarital sex — it seems to me that for most Palestinian Muslim girls who decide that
religious faith has low meaning for them, the path to that point almost certainly has
to pass through the “religious milieu” or at least through strong religious
socialization and expectations of conformity [unless their parents are secular, which
produces more of the learned mode of the first type]. For similarly inclined boys, on
the other hand, such a passage is not required, essential to, or informative of their
“secular” choice. It is thus less likely that “assimilation” would seem to explain the
female path and “disenchantment with religion” the male path. Surely, Muna had to
engage in a different personal struggle than Ismael as to whether she was beckoned
by faith in God. Although they interpret their paths in the ways that they did, I think
they both experienced exposure to other ways of life (pluralism / assimilation) as
well as disenchantment with religion, although they did so differently because of
their very different gendered trajectories. In light of these gendered pathways, I
would temper strict notions of assimilation and disenchantment, or external
[pluralistic society for the male] versus internal [religious milieu for the female]
social forces with notions of gendered agency.
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Overall, I would like to see the author develop and refine each of these ideal types of
secularism based on many more cases. When he does so, he not only will be able to
convince the reader of his findings, he also will be able to tease out more fully what
is going on, give more consideration to generational changes and gendered patterns,
and reflect on where Palestinian secularism might be headed.
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